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Steiner: Incentinve Conditions: The Validity of Innovative Financial Pare

INCENTIVE CONDITIONS: THE VALIDITY OF
INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL PARENTING BY
PASSING ALONG WEALTH AND VALUES
I. INTRODUCTION
An incentive condition is a provision in a will or trust that is meant
to induce or motivate a beneficiary to act in order to receive money from
a testator.1 States need to adopt statutes that allow incentive conditions
within certain limitations to avoid potential conflict, confusion, and
litigation.2 Further, in order to address the public policy concerns
regarding incentive trusts, states should codify specific limitations to
drafting incentive conditions.3
Baby-boomers will give an estimated twenty-five trillion dollars
through inheritances during the next fifty years.4
Parents and
grandparents are increasingly concerned about the negative
consequences that inherited wealth may have on their heirs.5 While
wealth transmissions of yesterday tended to center on major items of
patrimony, today’s wealth transmissions center on the investment in
values and skills.6 Thus, while planning how to dispense their wealth,
many people are planning how to pass down their work ethic, religion,
educational goals, and philanthropic values by creating wills and trusts
containing incentive conditions.7
In order to determine the validity of a given incentive condition, the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts proposes three guidelines.8 According to the
Restatement, although an individual is free to give or withhold property
from another during his lifetime, it does not follow that the individual
can attach whatever terms or conditions he chooses to attach by trust.9
See infra Part II.C. For a definition of “testator,” see note 29.
See infra Part III.
3
See infra Parts III–IV.
4
Mary Hickok, Family Incentive Trusts Pass Along Values Too: Concerns About Spoiling
Heirs Have Boosted the Popularity of Such Plans, 26 NAT’L L.J. 16, 16 (2004). Attorneys and
other trust professionals will be the key to the success of the transfer process. Id.; see also
Ellen E. Whiting, Controlling Behavior by Controlling the Inheritance: Considerations in Drafting
Incentive Provisions, 15 PROB. & PROP. 6 (Sept./Oct. 2001).
5
Whiting, supra note 4. Some of the concerns include wasting the inherited, easily
attained money; not learning to be a productive, hard working citizen; or practicing a
particular religion. Id.
6
John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1988); see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
7
Hickok, supra note 4, at 16.
8
See infra Part II.D.
9
See infra Part II.
1
2
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Though the Restatement sets forth some guidelines, there still exists a
gray area as to the validity of a designed condition in a trust.10 In
addition, many states lack codified language and vary in treatment
concerning incentive conditions, which will inevitably lead to conflict,
confusion, and unnecessary litigation.11
To avoid litigation that may arise in the future when incentive trusts
are interpreted, states must adopt statutes dealing with the requirements
and validity of an incentive condition.12 In order to address concerns
regarding a beneficiary’s choice and dead-hand control while still
allowing individuals to freely distribute their wealth, states should adopt
statutes that provide specific limitations to drafting incentive
conditions.13
This Note first sets forth the background of estate planning and
incentive conditions, discussing case law and the Restatement’s
treatment of incentive conditions.14 Next, this Note analyzes why states
should allow incentive conditions within certain limitations and why the
current case law, statutes, and Restatements do not sufficiently address
incentive conditions.15 Finally, this Note sets forth a suggested statute
that a state should adopt to consistently address the treatment of
incentive conditions.16
II. BACKGROUND
Through incentive trusts, individuals attach contingencies on
transfers of their wealth based on work ethic, religion, and education
because many individuals planning how to distribute their wealth are
concerned with passing along their values and morals.17 Further,
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
12
See infra Part II.
13
See infra Part III. Despite the view of a state, it is imperative that states adopt some
statutory provision to deal with incentive conditions to avoid tying up its courts with
litigation. Id. For a definition of dead-hand control, see infra note 78.
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Parts III.A–B.
16
See infra Part IV.
17
Hickock, supra note 4. For example, in Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825
(Ohio App. 1974), a father was concerned about supporting the Jewish religion and
conditioned his son’s inheritance on his marriage to a Jewish woman. Id. at 826; see infra
notes 122–24 and accompanying text. For example, parents are concerned that their
children will not learn to appreciate working hard, will not get an education, and will rely
on inherited wealth, making the children unproductive citizens. Hickok, supra note 4, at
16.
10
11
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individuals now describe behavioral incentive conditions using a great
deal of creative freedom.18 Some individuals act as if the sky is the limit
with respect to the freedom they use in drafting incentive conditions.19
However, in some cases, courts have ruled that particular incentive
conditions contained in a will or trust are invalid, causing a transfer of
wealth in a way not desired by the individual who made the will or
trust.20 First, Part II.A discusses the general background of estate
planning, and Part II.B discusses individual state statutes that are
pertinent to estate planning.21 Next, Part II.C discusses incentive
conditions in general.22 Part II.D describes the Restatement’s treatment
of incentive conditions.23 Finally, Part II.E discusses the varying
methods utilized in treating specific types of incentive conditions,
including in terrorem clauses, marriage and family relationships,
religion, the language of the condition, and state regulation of incentive
conditions.24
A. General Background of Estate Planning
The goal of an estate plan is to ensure that one’s property passes to
those whom he wishes to receive it, in the manner in which he wishes
them to receive it, and at a minimum cost.25 The cost of an estate plan is
measured in terms of administration expenses, court costs, attorneys’
fees, and taxes.26 In order to accomplish his specific goals, a property

See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
20
See infra Part II.E.
21
See infra Parts II.A–B.
22
See infra Part II.C.
23
See infra Part II.D.
24
See infra Part II.E.
25
ALINE F. ANDERSON & DIANE HUBBARD KENNEDY, ANDERSON’S WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATE PLANNING § 1:1 (2004). Anderson and Kennedy state:
The goal of estate planning is to transfer property upon death, taking
into account the owner’s desires and possible tax administrative costs.
The planner must consider the client’s assets, their fair market value,
the manner in which the assets are titled, the intended beneficiaries
and federal and state tax ramifications.
Id. For a history of estate planning administration, see Sarajane Love, Estate Creditors, the
Constitution, and the Uniform Probate Code, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 411, 415–25 (1996).
26
ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 1:1. Unless legislation changes the Internal
Revenue Code, estate tax is phasing out entirely and will not exist for one year as of the
year 2010. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2004).
18
19
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owner has options to transfer what he owns by means of a will, trust, or
a state’s intestate laws.27
A will is a purely testamentary legal tool that is effective only after
the death of its maker.28 The testator specifies certain individuals as
beneficiaries, defines what each beneficiary will receive, and appoints an
executor to handle the work.29 The will controls disposition of property
held in the testator’s name alone.30 The property becomes payable to the
testator’s probate estate after his death.31 A properly drafted will can

ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 1:1. When a property owner does not have a
will at the time of his death, intestacy is the result and statutes establish an estate plan. Id.
§ 1:11. Also, individuals can transfer wealth by gift, which is a transfer of property during
the lifetime of the transferor for less than full and adequate consideration. 26 U.S.C.
§ 2053(c)(1)(A) (2004). When an individual dies and probate is necessary, a personal
representative must oversee the winding up of the decedent’s estate. JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 35 (6th ed. 2000). The personal
representative examines and collects the assets of the decedent, manages the assets during
administration, receives and pays the claims of creditors, and distributes the remaining
assets to those entitled. Id. at 35, 36. Further, personal representatives, if not named by the
will, are appointed by the probate court and are under the control of and accountable to the
probate court. Id. at 36; see infra note 31.
28
See ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 2:1; Paul Premack, Difference Between Trust
& Will (Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.premack.com/columns/2003/2003-0304.htm.
29
Premack, supra note 28. Testator is defined as, “[a] person who has made a will; esp., a
person who dies leaving a will.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1514 (8th ed. 2004). While a
testator is a man who makes a will, a testatrix is a woman who makes a will. GERRY W.
BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 5 (2d ed. 2002). An executor is the person the testator
names to carry out the provisions of his will. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (8th ed. 2004).
Although a will can establish a trust in order to impose restrictions on certain heirs, that
trust operates only after the will has been probated. Premack, supra note 28. The executor
receives legal credentials to act for the decedent’s estate upon the death of the maker of the
will. MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE PLANNING 1 (2003). The
executor is the personal representative that is named in a will of a decedent who dies
testate. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 36. One of the advantages of having a
will as opposed to dying intestate is that the testator can name the executor of his estate. Id.
If a person dies intestate or fails to name an executor who can administer the estate, the
administor is selected from a statutory list of individuals in the following order: surviving
spouse, children, parents, siblings, creditors. Id.
30
MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 29, at 1. A settlor is “a person who furnishes,
either directly or indirectly, the consideration or corpus for a trust.” Id. Disposition of
property refers to the distribution of the testator’s property to those who are entitled to the
property. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 36.
31
BEYER, supra note 29, at 3. Probate is the legal process through which a will is
activated. Premack, supra note 28. Further, “[t]here are three major functions of probate,
which is the administration of the decedent’s estate: (1) to provide evidence of transfer of
title, (2) to protect creditors by requiring payment of debts, and (3) to distribute the
decedent’s property according to his or her intent.” Melissa B. Vegter, Comment, The
“ART” of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation Requiring Proof of Parental Intent Before
27
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make the probate process more efficient by eliminating court supervision
of the executor, who completes the decedent’s remaining business and
distributes the remaining assets.32 If an individual has no will, the
intestacy laws of the state in which he is a legal resident generally control
the disposition of his property.33
A trust, on the other hand, is a fiduciary relationship concerning
property management arrangements in which one person, the trustee,
manages assets for the benefit of another person, the beneficiary.34 In
Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from a Deceased Parent’s Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REV.
267, 315 n.32 (2003) (referring to DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 39).
32
Premack, supra note 28. Sometimes the will’s maker desires court supervision or fails
to waive it. Id. If so, probate can become a slow, detailed process. Id. Further, the
administrative costs of probate include fees from probate court, an attorney, personal
representatives, appraisers, and guardian ad litems. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note
27, at 44.
33
ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 1:11. A state’s intestacy laws distribute
property of a decedent who has died without a will according to state statutes that were
written by the legislature. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 72. In drafting a
state’s intestacy laws, the legislature made its best guess as to how the decedent would
have distributed his money if he had made a will. Id. One-third of the states follow the
model Uniform Probate Code’s intestate section. Id. Regarding an intestate estate, the
Uniform Probate Code states:
(a) Any part of a decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will
passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in
this Code, except as modified by the decedent’s will. (b) A decedent
by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or
class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate
succession. If that individual or a member of that class survives the
decedent, the share of the decedent’s intestate estate to which that
individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual
or each member of that class had disclaimed his [or her] intestate
share.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (amended 1993). Other states, such as Indiana, have adopted
their own code. IND. CODE § 29-1-2-1 (2004). For example, the Indiana Code lists several
circumstances in which to give out property of a person who has died intestate. Id. The
state code provides that property belonging to a person dying intestate shall pass to the
surviving spouse if there is no surviving issue or parent of the deceased. Id. § 29-1-21(b)(3). If the person is survived by at least one child or the issue of at least one deceased
child, the surviving spouse gets one-half of the property. Id. § 29-1-2-1(b)(1). The surviving
spouse shall receive three-fourths of the net estate when there are no surviving children but
one or both of the decedent’s parents are surviving. Id. § 29-1-2-1(b)(2). After giving the
surviving spouse his share, the remaining property is distributed using the following
hierarchy list: the decedent’s children, the surviving parents if there is a surviving spouse
and no surviving children, the surviving parents and siblings including children of
deceased siblings, the nephews and nieces, and the grandparents. Id. § 29-1-2-1(d). If
money is left over after descending through the list, then the money goes to the state. Id.
§ 29-1-2-1(d)(8).
34
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed.
1984 & Supp. 2004). The person for whom a trust is established is called the “beneficiary.”
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addition, a property owner may transfer property to a trust during his
lifetime, and the terms of the trust document control the disposition of
the property during the life and after the death of the settlor.35

Id. Where the beneficiary is an individual, the trust is a private trust. Id. An artificial legal
entity, such as a corporation, may also serve as a beneficiary to a trust. Id. The beneficiary
of a charitable trust is the public. Id. “[A] trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one
person is the holder of the title to property subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use
the property for the benefit of another.” Jewish Cmty. Ass’n v. Cmty. Bank, 6 P.3d 1264,
1266 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Scotti’s Drive In Restaurants, Inc. v. Mile High Oil-Dart In Corp.,
526 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Wyo. 1974)). A trustee is a person who holds title to property in a trust
and has the duty to manage the property according to the instructions of the settlor and
applicable trust law. BEYER, supra note 29, at 5.
35
MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 29, at 2. The person who intentionally
causes the trust to come into existence is called the “settlor.” BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
34, § 1. This individual who creates the trust is often called the trustor, grantor, foundor,
donor, or creator of the trust. Id. Where the trust is created by will, the individual who
created the trust is called the testator. Id. Trusts are revocable or irrevocable, taxmotivated or tax-neutral, and testamentary or inter-vivos. Premack, supra note 28. A
“living trust” is a special trust subcategory that is revocable, tax-neutral, and operates both
during and after the lifetime of the creator of the trust. Id. At its inception, a living trust’s
assets are usually managed by its creator unless he becomes disabled. Id. If the creator
becomes disabled, an alternate trustee takes over and uses the trust assets to pay bills, buy
food, and provide shelter and care for the trust creator. Id. When the trust creator dies, the
alternate trustee enacts provisions that identify alternate beneficiaries, distributing assets to
specific individuals. Id. The property owner is called the testator if male and the testatrix if
female. MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 29, at 2. The trust property is the
property interest, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which the trustee holds, subject to
the rights of the beneficiary. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1. In order to create a valid
private trust, the trust instrument must contain: (1) an expression of intent to hold
property for the benefit of a person other than the settlor, (2) the name of at least one
beneficiary, and (3) an interest in property that is in existence or is ascertainable and held
for the benefit of the beneficiary. Id. Trust instrument refers to the document, whether a
deed, agreement, or will, in which the settlor or testator expresses an intent to have a trust
and provides the details of the trust, the trust terms. Id. A trust instrument is not needed
when a trust is created without a writing. Id. When the trust is created without an
instrument, the terms of the trust are determined by evidence of the settlor’s intent. Id. A
trust that does not involve any written instrument is called an implied trust, while a trust
that goes through the requisite formalities is called an express trust. Id. § 8. A trust may be
created by:
(a) a transfer by the will of a property owner to another person as
trustee for one or more persons; or (b) a transfer inter vivos by a
property owner to another person as trustee for one or more persons;
or (c) a declaration by an owner of property that he or she holds that
property as trustee for one or more persons; or (d) an exercise of a
power of appointment by appointing property to a person as trustee
for one or more persons who are objects of the power; or (e) a promise
or beneficiary designation that creates enforceable rights in a person
who immediately or later holds those rights as trustee, or who
pursuant to those rights later receives property as trustee, for one or
more persons.
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Typically, after-death distributions under a trust are implemented
privately without the need for probate.36 A trust avoids probate because
the trust creator, while still living, transfers assets into the name of the
trustee or name of the trust.37 If any assets were not transferred to the
trust, those assets may still pass according to the stipulations described
in the will or by way of intestacy.38 Thus, while wills are less expensive
initially, they usually require probate, which renders them more
expensive and more time consuming to execute.39 Trusts, on the other
hand, are initially more expensive, but because they usually avoid the
probate process, they are ultimately less expensive and less time
consuming.40 Just as trusts are created to manage a testator’s property,
states have also developed statutes to manage the intricacies of trusts.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10 (2003). In addition, trusts are classified with respect
to their method of creation and with respect to the point of view of the purpose or objective
of the trust. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1. Regarding classifications based on the
method of creation, a settlor creates a living trust when the settlor is a living settlor. Id.
When the source of the trust is the creator’s will, a testamentary trust is created. Id. Private
trusts exist for the benefit of one or more individuals, while charitable or public trusts exist
for the advantage of society or a large segment of society. Id. Regarding instances when
trusts are classified from the point of view of its objective, family trusts are used when the
primary purpose is to distribute property among relatives. Id. at 13. Business or
commercial objectives, when in a trust, are called business trusts. Id. An investment trust
is a trust used to furnish and administer funds for investments. Id.
36
Premack, supra note 28.
37
Id. For example, any real estate owned by the trust creator should have been deeded
to the trustee at about the same time the trust was created. Id. The concept of transferring
assets is called “funding” the trust and is what eventually avoids probate. Id. Assets that
were transferred to the trustee are under the trustee’s legal control. Id. The death of the
trust creator does not change that control; rather, it is a signal to the trustee to enact the
provisions identifying alternate beneficiaries. Id.; see supra note 35.
38
Premack, supra note 28. Thus, a living trust is not an absolute guarantee that there
will not also be a probate. Id.
39
Id.
40
Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, Revocable Trusts Advantages, Disadvantages and Myths (2004),
available at http://www.ftci.com/jsp/content.jsp?url=/commentary/FTI_Trust_Topics
RevocableTrusts. How much of a benefit it may be varies from one place to the next. Id.
For example, avoiding probate may be a significant benefit for a person who owns real
estate in more than one state because he can avoid multiple probate proceedings. Id.
Because each jurisdiction’s probate process is different, it is necessary to consult local
counsel to determine which, if any, disadvantages of probate apply. Premack, supra note
28. Trusts and wills are two different roads that lead to the same destination. Id. Which
road is selected depends on individual needs and preferences. Id. Regarding intestacy,
some of the disadvantages to intestacy are that intended beneficiaries may get nothing and
that beneficiaries take shares outright, regardless of whether the beneficiary can handle the
property. ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 1:12.
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B. State Regulation of Trusts
At the end of the eighteenth century, when trusts came into common
use in America, litigated disputes were common despite the poverty and
newness of America.41 However, since the beginning of the nineteenth
century, trust law has greatly developed in order to adapt to changing
economic and social conditions.42 Although many countries, such as
England, have codified laws regarding trusts to meet changing
conditions with regard to business and property law, in the United
States, only a handful of states have codified trust principles.43 Further,
states possess the authority to grant the right to receive property.44 Each
state has the power to choose how to regulate the transfer of property
within its boundaries.45
Only some states have trust codes or statutes containing detailed
rules that govern the creation and administration of trusts.46 Most states’
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1. The American colonies adopted the English
system of trusts. Id. For a list of twenty-eight early cases where a trust was discussed or
construed in America in the late eighteenth century, see id.
42
Id. To read articles that trace the developments made in trust law, see Developments in
the Law of Trusts, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1162 (1935).
43
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1. For example, England has codified a
considerable amount of trust law since 1850, including the Judicial Trustee Act, the Public
Trustee Act, the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1964, and the Variation of Trusts
Act. Id. Scotland, Canada, and Australia have also developed legislation regarding trust
law that is similar to England. Id.; see also infra note 160.
44
Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331, 335 (1874); Hall v. Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162, 1164
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (“The right to receive property by devise or descent is not a
natural right but a privilege granted by the State.”); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Bouse, 29
A.2d 906, 910 (Md. 1943).
45
Mager v. Grima 49 U.S. 490 (1850); Vallandingham, 540 A.2d at 1164. The court stated:
Every State possesses the power to regulate the manner or term by
which property within its dominion may be transmitted by will or
inheritance and to prescribe who shall or shall not be capable of
receiving that property. A State may deny the privilege altogether or
may impose whatever restrictions or conditions upon the grant it
deems appropriate.
Vallandingham, 540 A.2d at 1164.
46
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1. Leading the way in state codification of trust
laws, New York and California were the first states that codified many trust principles. Id.
§ 1, at 29. In addition, some other states, such as Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, have trust codes or statutes containing detailed rules that
govern the creation and administration of trusts. Id. Texas has also joined the group of
states that have provisions that are related to trust laws in its Trust Act, which was
consolidated into its Property Code in 1984. Id. More recently, Washington, Montana,
Michigan, Arkansas, Missouri, and Iowa have adopted provisions that deal with trust law.
Id. The state of New York’s Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law, which took effect in 1967,
codified in one chapter all statutes covering the substantive law of estates and trusts,
41
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statutes regarding trust laws are incomplete and govern only limited
aspects of trusts.47 Although many provisions of Article VII of the
Uniform Probate Code have been adopted by a number of states in some
form, the concept of trust regulation is a novel concept.48 Specifically, in
states where trusts are not subject to statutory regulation or direct
judicial supervision, concern may exist that the registration and
permissive court proceedings provided in Article VII will lead to
additional litigation and tying up of the courts.49
Individuals
increasingly utilize the freedom states allow in drafting trusts by adding
incentive conditions to manipulate the behavior of their beneficiaries,
which typically include family members.50
C. Incentive Conditions
In today’s society, many wealthy individuals strategize about
distributing their possessions.51 Often, people are more concerned with
including powers and regulations of fiduciaries’ activities. Id. In 1987, California enacted
Cal.Stats.1986, c. 820, a Trust Law, as part of the California Probate Code. Id. Also,
Montana adopted a new trust code in 1989 that was patterned after the California Probate
Code. Id.
47
Id. § 1, at 34. These undeveloped statutes merely guide the creation of trusts and steer
the trustee in carrying out his administration duties. Id. § 1, at 35. Many times, the
provision applies only where the settlor has not otherwise provided in a trust himself. Id.
One example includes legislation establishing authorized trust investments, which grants
broad powers to trustees and sets forth rules as to trust accountings and trustee
compensation. Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. Specifically, Indiana, a state with more developed trust laws, has statutes
concerning certain types of provisions that are void because the provisions are against
public policy. Id. According to Indiana law regarding restraint of marriage, “[a] devise to a
spouse with a condition in restraint of marriage shall stand, but the condition shall be
void.” IND. CODE § 29-1-6-3 (2004).
50
See infra Part II.C.
51
James Edward Harris, Level Five Philanthropy: Designing a Plan for Strategic, Effective,
Efficient Giving, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 20 (1999) (quoting Doing Well By Doing
Good, Improving Client Service Increases Philanthropic Capital: The Legal and Financial Advisors
Role, 2000 THE PHILANTHROPIC INITIATIVE, INC. 9). Most of those interested in the incentive
trusts have also made their fortunes in recent years and have a negative bias against
inherited wealth. Monica Langley & Ricardo Gandara, You Worked to Earn Your Millions,
but Will Your Kids be Spoiled Trust, AUSTIN AM.—STATESMAN, Jan. 8, 2000, at D1. The
concept is proving enormously popular as a form of “financial parenting,” as well as a
good way to avoid estate taxes. Id. Atlanta Braves star pitcher, Tom Glavine, who has an
annual salary of eight million dollars, has created a family incentive trust for his children.
Monica Langley, Trust Me Baby: The House, the Money, It’ll All Be Yours; There’s Just One
Thing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1999, at A1. Glavine’s trust provides that the trust will match
the income the children earn up to $100,000. Id. Glavine also intends to encourage his
family, through trust money, to play sports, set up a veterinary practice (or other business),
stay at home with their kids, and do well in school. Id.
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keeping their heirs in line rather than avoiding probate and minimizing
their taxes.52 An emerging central goal of estate planning is to protect
and preserve the family’s values, as opposed to the goal of protecting
and preserving the family’s assets.53 Wealth transmission formerly
centered on birthright, but now wealth transmission centers on the
investment of skills or values.54 Therefore, when a property owner is
primarily concerned with preserving values, he will create an incentive
condition regarding his expectations of his offspring’s conduct, his belief
about marriage or divorce, or his desire for charitable behavior.55

52
Whiting, supra note 4, at 6. The most pressing issues among wealthy people today are
protecting the family wealth and encouraging productivity. Id. The top 0.5% of wealthy
Americans were concerned that their heirs would be materialistic or naïve about money,
according to a recent survey by U.S. Trust. Id. Warren Buffett was quoted saying that “the
perfect inheritance is enough money so that they feel they can do anything, but not so
much that they could do nothing.” Id. In addition, absent a legislative change of the
Internal Revenue Code, the estate tax exemption will disappear in 2010. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2001.
53
John. J. Scroggin, Restraining an Inheritance Can Accomplish a Client’s Objectives, 30 EST.
PLAN. 124, 124 (2003). Property owners are sometimes unwilling to give large inheritances
to beneficiaries because they fear that they have failed to teach their children financial
responsibility. Id.
54
John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1988). Items of patrimony include the family farm or firm and the
ability to rescue a beneficiary from the harsh fate of being a mere laborer. Id. As a
consequence of the new trend to transfer money to invest in skills, transfers occur during
the life of the beneficiaries rather than at the death of the benefactor. Id. Further, children
get financial help from their parents today during their lifetimes for expenses such as
education, but they do not depend on any inheritance. Id. People are also living longer
and their parents do not pass away until they are at least middle aged so children do not
depend on an inheritance for support. Id.
55
Scroggin, supra note 53, at 124. In each of the circumstances, some form of restrained
inheritance exists. Id. In particular, one strategy aimed to pass along values in addition to
wealth is to initiate incentive conditions in a trust. Hickok, supra note 4, at 17. Any
properly drafted trust, i.e., life insurance trust, credit shelter trust, dynasty or generation
skipping trust, revocable trust, or charitable trust, is acceptable to contain an incentive
condition. Whiting, supra note 4, at 6. In addition, according to Harris:
A growing body of literature encourages people to identify their basic
values and to write a personal mission statement: a clear, concise
declaration of their purpose in life and what they hope to accomplish
with it. Two best sellers that advocate this are The Seven Habits of
Highly Effective People, by Stephen Covey, and What Color is Your
Parachute, by Richard Bolles. Covey develops a personal planning
system that applies values and mission to the various roles in life and
develops goals for each role. Bolles combines those ideas with the
concept of discovering one’s unique skills and interests to land the job
of one’s dreams.
Harris, supra note 51, at 21–22. When a property owner is primarily concerned with
preserving his values, the plan initially concentrates on non-tax issues such as incentive
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An incentive condition is a type of condition precedent or condition
subsequent that allows an heir to inherit only if he has behaved in a
desired way described in the trust.56 The ability to devise individually
tailored conditions that are effective beyond one’s lifetime has made the
trust a treasured device, making creatively devised incentive conditions
a new trend of the millennium.57 Examples of encouraged behavior
conditions. Scroggin, supra note 53, at 124. Providing examples of the possible non-tax
incentives in a trust, Scroggin lists:
[T]aking into account the offspring, marriage, personality, and
character of each child. Focusing on difficult family issues (e.g., the
expectation of divorce). Minimizing the sources of potential family
conflicts (e.g., personal property dispositions). Creating opportunities
and incentives for heirs, without supporting an unearned lifestyle.
Assisting the client’s desire to pass on productive values to future
generations. Encouraging charitable involvement. Placing reasonable,
flexible restraints on inherited wealth. Building balance and flexibility
into the plan to permit modifications in the future.
Id.
56
Hickok, supra note 4, at 17. A condition is “[a] stipulation or prerequisite in a contract,
will, or other instrument, constituting the essence of the instrument.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 312 (8th ed. 2004). Further, a condition precedent is defined as:
An act or event, other than a lapse of time, that must exist or occur
before a duty to perform something promised arises. If the condition
does not occur and is not excused, the promised performance need not
be rendered. The most common condition contemplated by this
phrase is the immediate or unconditional duty of performance by a
promisor.
Id. A condition subsequent is “[a] condition that, if it occurs, will bring something else to
an end; an event the existence of which, by agreement of the parties, discharges a duty of
performance that has arisen.” Id. For example, Microsoft millionaire, Greg Tracy has
written in his children’s trust that the children must “demonstrate financial responsibility,
gainful employment and lack of harmful dependencies.” Langley, supra note 51, at D1. If
the child is getting an education or working, the trust can make liberal distributions. Id.
However, the distributions are cut off if the child is on drugs, abusing alcohol, or in a cult.
Id. In summary, incentive trusts are intended to motivate or discourage particular conduct
by the beneficiary. Financial Planning Ass’n, The Pros and Cons of Incentive Trusts (2001),
available at http://www.bevbank.com/library/0101/. For example, an incentive condition
providing that a beneficiary receive money from a trust only if he does not harass another
beneficiary discourages the particular behavior of harassing the other beneficiaries for
money. See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
57
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003). The Restatement states:
The private trust is tolerated, even treasured, in the common-law
world for the flexibility it offers to property owners in planning and
designing diverse beneficial interests and financial protections over
time, individually tailored as the particular property owner deems best
to the varied needs, abilities, and circumstances of particular family
members and others whom the owner chooses to benefit.
Id. In order to pass along values, as well as money, creatively devising incentive conditions
has become a new trend for the millennium. Langley, supra note 51, at A1. Langley’s
article quotes Rodney Owens, an attorney whose clients are incorporating incentives and
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depicted in an incentive condition include obtaining an education or
post-graduate degree, showing a good work ethic, demonstrating
stewardship, or engaging in philanthropic behavior.58 Other goals
include, but are not limited to, benevolence, missionary work, marriage,
and saving for retirement.59 Many property owners wish to discourage
other behavior, such as squandering, consumption, laziness, or any
illegal activity.60 Not only are there many different values that property
owners desire, there are also many different conditions property owners
establish in order to accomplish their desires.61
Upon examining the history of incentive conditions, it is apparent
that wealthy parents have historically attached conditions to the passing
of their fortunes.62 One of the oldest and most common conditions
involved an age requirement, where a beneficiary received wealth only

disincentives into their estate plans. Id. Many of his clients’ trusts deny payments if, for
example, children do not set up a prenuptial agreement or if they fail a drug test. Id. The
trusts also reward charitable work or participation in family foundations. Id.
58
Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, Incentive Trusts: An Idea Whose Time has Come (and
Gone?) (2004), available at http://www.wellsmar.com/CM/NewsandArticles/Newsand
Articles42.asp. Individuals use incentive conditions by distributing wealth based on a
beneficiary earning a certain degree, maintaining a stated grade point average, or attending
a particular school. Clark Hill PLC, Use Incentive Trusts to Reinforce Values (2002), available
at
http://www.clarkhill.com/law_media/IEP2002-06.pdf#search=‘incentive%20trusts’.
For example, a beneficiary may discover that he is entitled to one million dollars from his
uncle if and only if he gets a bachelor’s degree. Id.
59
Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58; Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58. An
incentive condition may encourage community involvement or volunteerism by stating
that the trust will match any donations given by the beneficiary. Clark Hill PLC, supra note
58. The trust may also distribute funds in the trust if the beneficiary pursues a low-income
career, such as teaching, social work, or a religious career. Id. Provisions may also allow
for the distribution of money to a beneficiary who takes an active role in the family’s
philanthropic movement. Id.
60
Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58; Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58.
Commonly, individuals will design incentive conditions around the beneficiary’s choices
regarding the beneficiary’s health. Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58. For instance, a condition
may state that the beneficiary may not drink, smoke, or do drugs, and the trust may state
that the beneficiary must maintain a certain weight. Id.
61
Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58.
62
Langley, supra note 51, at A1. What is new in the incentive approach is the wideranging and highly specific nature of the parental conditions. Langley & Gandara, supra
note 51, at D1. Parents are often picking incentives that correlate to strikingly idiosyncratic
concerns. Id. “The only limit is the imagination,” according to one attorney. Id. Parents
are planning conditions that involve the chances of the beneficiary becoming legally
incapacitated due to a physical or mental disability. Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra
note 58. The beneficiary may be a spendthrift, chemically dependent, easily influenced, or
consistently make bad choices regarding such things as marriage partners and financial
matters. Id.
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when the beneficiary reached a named age in the trust or will.63 For
example, in Webster v. Morris,64 the testator provided that an executor
must keep the principal sum of the value of an estate given to the
testator’s grandson in a trust until the grandson reached thirty years of
age.65 The condition was set so that the child could mature and know
how to handle financial matters in an appropriate way.66 The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin allowed the condition and stated that everyone has a
legal right to transfer his property as he sees fit.67 Another long-standing
and popular example of a condition in a trust is where an inheritance is
63
Financial Planning Ass’n, supra note 56. This type of trust is also called a delayed
distribution. Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58. According to Harris:
The practice of creating a lasting expression of one’s most deeply held
values is not new. Examples of the ancient custom of “ethical wills,”
statements intended to pass along values and beliefs to succeeding
generations, can be found among the Old Testament patriarchs. First
handed down in oral tradition and later reduced to writing, ethical
wills at one point became as common as attachments to legal wills. Dr.
Barry Baines, the leading advocate for ethical wills today, uses this
comparison: “Legal wills bequeath valuables, while ethical wills
bequeath values.”
Harris, supra note 51, at 22.
64
28 N.W. 353 (Wis. 1886). In this case, a father’s will conditioned his grandson’s
inheritance on the grandson reaching thirty years of age. Id. at 360. In addition, the
property was conditioned on the grandson being mature, as determined by the trustee. Id.
The court ruled that the condition was valid and did not violate public policy because
people can transfer their property as they see fit. Id.
65
Id. at 355. Specifically, the part of the will that stipulated that the grandson will
receive the principal of the money only when he reached the age of thirty stated:
I give . . . my grandson . . . the sum of ten thousand dollars; said sum
to be invested and put to use, and the interest arising therefrom, or so
much as said child’s guardian and my executors, hereinafter
mentioned, may consider proper and necessary, be used for the
support and education of said child, and at his majority the
unexpended interest from said principal sum be paid him, and the
interest on said sum annually thereafter until he arrives at the age of
thirty years, at which time I will and direct that my executors pay to
said Edward Morris one half of said ten thousand dollars, and one
thousand dollars each year thereafter, together with all interest earned,
until the balance of said ten thousand dollars hereby willed to him has
been paid: provided, however, that said Edward Morris has in the
mean time learned some useful trade, business, or profession, and is of
good moral character, my executors to determine whether said child
has fully complied with said proviso before any payments from the
principal sum are made to him.
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 360. The court further stated that the age restriction was also reasonable and the
other requirements stated in the condition were capable of performance by any person of
ordinary intelligence. Id. at 362.
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given in installments so that the beneficiary can learn how to handle
money in increments along the way.68
Today, many individuals exercise a great deal of freedom in
selecting and describing behavioral incentives in their trusts.69 Although
most states have not specifically addressed the issue of policing the
freedom of incentive conditions, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts sets
forth guidelines in evaluating the validity of a given condition.70
D. The Restatement’s Treatment of Incentive Conditions
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts addresses the requirements and
validity of incentive conditions.71 In order to allow and limit the use of
trusts, the Restatement has proposed three conditions that, if not fully
satisfied, will invalidate an incentive condition.72
According to
Restatement section 29, a trust or provision in a trust is invalid if it
requires the beneficiary to commit a criminal or tortious act, if it violates
the applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, or if it is against public policy.73
In the instance that one of the three situations in section 29 is present in a
68
Financial Planning Ass’n, supra note 56. An example of a trust with installment
payments is when an individual makes a trust where the beneficiary is to receive a certain
amount of money when the individual turns eighteen, twenty, twenty-five, and the
remainder when he turns thirty.
69
Langley & Gandara, supra note 51, at D1. One attorney has described the incentive
condition by saying that the only limit of the provisions is the imagination. Id.
70
See infra Part II.D.
71
See infra Part II.D.
72
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003). Specifically, the Restatement
reads: “An intended trust or trust provision is invalid if: (a) its purpose is unlawful or its
performance calls for the commission of a criminal or tortious act; (b) it violates rules
relating to perpetuities; or (c) it is contrary to public policy.” Id.
73
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003). Regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities:
The fundamental policy assumption of the Rule against Perpetuities is
that vested interests are not objectionable, but contingent interests are.
The Rule against Perpetuities limits the time during which property
can be made subject to contingent interests to “lives in being plus 21
years.” . . . The Rule has two basic purposes: (1) to keep property
marketable and available for productive development in accordance
with market demands; and (2) to limit “dead hand” control over the
property, which prevents the current owners from using the property
to respond to present needs. The second purpose is implemented by
curbing trusts, which, after a period of time and change in
circumstances, tie up the family in disadvantageous and undesirable
arrangements, leaving the beneficiaries unable to meet current newly
arising exigencies. In addition, if not limited in their duration, trusts
would tend to create a permanent class of rich families, whose wealth
would not depend on their abilities.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27.
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trust, the validity of the trust as a whole depends on whether the
unlawful provision can be appropriately modified or separated from the
other provisions without defeating the testator’s intent.74
Examining the provisions in section 29, the first two clauses can be
easily interpreted and are less objective than the third clause regarding
public policy, which can be interpreted differently by different courts.75

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. c (2003).
Id. § 29 cmt. i. Clause (a) addresses situations that involve impermissible purposes or
provisions of the trust itself. Id. § 29 cmt. b. In general, if a trust provision requires the
commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee, the provision is invalid. Id. § 29
cmt. c. For example:
[W]here several persons establish a fund to be held in trust for the
purpose of securing, through bribery, legislation or administrative
action favorable to their business activities, the intended trust is
unenforceable. Similarly, an intended trust or provision to participate
in an unlawful business, such as the marketing of legally prohibited
substances or the unlicensed practice of medicine or law, is
unenforceable; and a direction to operate a factory on certain land is
unenforceable if the factory operation would be a tortious nuisance to
the owners of adjoining lots or would be in violation of environmental
law.
Id.
Public policy also forbids trust provisions that tend to undermine proper
administration of trusts. Id. § 29 cmts. f, i. Further, a trust incentive provision may be
invalid because the purpose that provision serves is fraudulent or unlawful or if the
provision is included for an unlawful consideration. Id. § 29 cmt. d.
For example, the owner of property might transfer it to another who
agrees to hold it in trust for the transferor or another with the purpose
being to conceal the interest of the transferor or other person, not
merely for reasons of privacy but in order to mislead the government
or others with respect to the true beneficial interests in the property.
Such a case may arise where a person pays money to another pursuant
to an oral agreement that the funds will be held in trust for the payor
and returned upon demand, intentionally creating a deceptive
appearance of ownership in the payee and thereby inducing a third
person to make a loan to the payee. Or a person may purchase land or
securities and, for the purpose of defrauding creditors or of evading a
prohibition or limitation in a statute, have title placed in the name of
another, who agrees to hold the property upon a trust for the
purchaser.
Id. In addition, clause (b) is also less objective in nature because it suggests that a trust
provision must not violate a state’s Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. § 29 cmt. e. According to
this rule, a condition in a trust automatically fails if the trust does not have at least one
definite beneficiary or does not describe at least one potential beneficiary within the
requirements of the rule against perpetuities. Id. § 29 cmt. g. The Restatement specifically
states that “a private trust fails unless the trust has one or more definite beneficiaries or
provides for one or more beneficiaries to be ascertained within the requirements of the
applicable rule against perpetuities.” Id. Further, according to the Restatement’s proposed
Rule Against Perpetuities, “[t]he period of the rule against perpetuities in donative
74
75
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Public policy concerns arise, for example, in provisions that interfere
with the beneficiary’s freedom to marry or religious freedom.76 These
examples are not the only incentive conditions that will invalidate a trust
provision.77 According to the comments of the Restatement, the third
clause of public policy is usually associated with dead-hand control.78
The goal of the clause is to reflect a compromise between the free
disposition of privately owned property and other social values.79
Although an individual is free to give to or withhold property from
another during his lifetime, it does not follow that the individual can
attach whatever terms or conditions he chooses to a trust.80 However,
neither simple nor precise rules of validity or invalidity exist when
applying the rule that an incentive condition must not violate public
policy.81
Regarding the public policy of promoting personal habits, the
Restatement provides that a provision in an otherwise effective transfer
is generally valid when the provision is aimed at preventing the
acquisition or retention of a property interest based on a specific
beneficiary’s personal habit.82 The Restatement also takes the position
transfers is 21 years after lives in being (the measuring lives) at the time the period of the
rule begins to run.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1 (1983).
76
Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58. Examples of provisions relating to
marriage that may violate public policy pertain to limiting the selection of a spouse or
unduly postponing marriage. Id.
77
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. a (2003). Other examples of ways to
invalidate a trust include an illegal or unethical act of the trustee, a beneficiary, or a third
person. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 44. Examples of invalidating causes that are
connected to the creation of a trust include cases of misrepresentation of fact, undue
influence, duress, and mistake. Id. For example, a court held that a trust was invalid when
beneficiaries made false statements to a settlor about the status of a person claiming to be
the settlor’s son and influenced the settlor to exclude his real son. Kinney v. St. Louis Trust
Co., 143 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. 1940). According to the Restatement, “[a] transfer in trust or
declaration of trust can be set aside, or the terms of a trust can be reformed, upon the same
grounds as those upon which a transfer of property not in trust can be set aside or
reformed.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 12 (2003).
78
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003). Dead-hand control is where the
person who gave his money away makes provisions in his trust that enables him to control
the actions of another even after he as passed away. Id.; see infra note 197 and
accompanying text.
79
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003). The Restatement recognizes that
the balance between free disposition of private property and social values may create a
burden on the courts to interpret and enforce the interests and conditions of the deceased
individual. Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 8.2 (1983). Specifically, “[a]n otherwise effective
provision in a donative transfer which is designed to prevent the acquisition or retention of
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that using restraints to induce or eliminate personal habits is not against
public policy.83 However, a closer look at specific cases illustrates the
difficulty in allowing any promotion or restraint on a personal habit.84
E. Case and Individual Treatment of Incentive Conditions
Traditionally, courts have upheld family incentive conditions written
to promote or restrain a beneficiary’s personal conduct unless the
conditions violated public policy.85
However, various court
interpretations and applications of whether a condition violates public
policy have led to conflict and confusion.86 The case law in this Part
discusses generally acceptable and unacceptable conditions regarding
the validity of family incentive trusts involving in terrorem provisions,
marriage, family relationships, religion, and the condition’s language.87

an interest in property on account of the transferee acquiring or persisting in specified
personal habits is valid.” Id. Personal habits can, for example, relate to the beneficiary’s
health by conditioning wealth on a beneficiary not smoking. Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58.
83
Id. For instance, while a testator may attach conditions on a beneficiary’s choice of
religion, generally a testator cannot attach a restraint on a beneficiary’s right to marry. See
infra Parts II.E.2–3.
84
See infra Part II.E.
85
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary
Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (1999). Also, the
Restatement sets forth the idea that incentive conditions pertaining to control personal
conduct is valid unless it is against public policy or violates another law. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP. § 5.1 (1983). The Restatement provides that “[u]nless contrary to public
policy or violative of some rule of law, a provision . . . designed to prevent the acquisition
or retention of an interest in property in the event of any failure on the part of the
transferee to comply with a restraint on personal conduct is valid.” Id. A trust or a
provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if its enforcement would be against public policy,
even though its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act
by the trustee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 (1959); Sherman, supra, at 1277
(quoting Lewis v. Searles, 452 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1970)).
86
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
87
See infra Parts II.E.1–3.
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In Terrorem Provisions

“In terrorem” is defined as “by way of threat; as a warning.”88 For
example, in Estate of Lewis,89 the court examined the validity of an “antiharassment clause,” where a settlor depicted in her trust that one trustee
was to determine if another had harassed him concerning matters related
to the money in the trust.90 If the first trustee reported that the second
trustee had harassed him, the first trustee was entitled to the second
trustee’s share.91 One of the beneficiaries objected to the anti-harassment
clause, claiming that it was an incentive condition that was against
public policy, and thus it was unenforceable.92 He stated that the clause
subjected him to an arbitrary and capricious withholding of lifesustaining funds, allowed the beneficiaries to concoct a story that would
suspend his payments, and gave the trustees the loose right to determine

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (8th ed. 1999). In addition, “in terrorem” has been
defined as “[i]n terror, or warning; by way of threat.” U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v.
Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 871 (Or. 1954). “The term is applied to gifts or legacies given on
conditions subsequent, because it is said that the possibility of losing the gift tends to
inspire fear or dread.” Id.; see infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. The term is
derived from a Latin word meaning “in fear.” General Publ’g Group, Law.com Dictionary
(2005), http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?typed=in+terrorem&type=1&submit1.x=
58&submit1.y=7. Further, one dictionary defines “in terrorem” as:
[A] provision in a will which threatens that if anyone challenges the
legality of the will or any part of it, then that person will be cut off or
given only a dollar, instead of getting the full gift provided in the will.
The clause is intended to discourage beneficiaries from causing a legal
ruckus after the will writer is gone.
Id.
89
770 A.2d 619 (Me. 2001). In this case, the court ruled that the anti-harassment
condition was valid at the time of the decision because the issue was not yet ripe. Id. at 624.
90
Id. at 619. The settlor in Lewis was survived by three sons, David, Paul, and the
contestant, Lawrence. Id. at 621. In addition to representing the testatrix, the attorney also
represented the settlor’s son, David, in estate planning matters and had prepared a will and
trust for Lawrence in 1972. Id. After the death of the testatrix, her sons, David and Paul,
and the attorney were informally appointed as personal representatives of the estate. Id.
Lawrence also claimed that the attorney’s dual representation created undue influence. Id.
The anti-harassment clause in Ms. Lewis’ will provided:
Provided however, that the Trustees may, in their sole and absolute
discretion, suspend making any and all payments to or for the benefit
of LAWRENCE LEWIS at any time when in the judgment of the
Trustees, LAWRENCE LEWIS is harassing any beneficiary or any
Trustee, or their agents, of any trust created hereunder.
Id. at 622–23.
91
Id. at 619.
92
Id. at 622–23. Lawrence objected to the clause when the personal representatives filed
for formal probate of the will and formal appointment of personal representatives. Id.
88
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harassment.93 The Supreme Court of Maine stated that the clause was
not against public policy, as of yet.94 The court held that the clause was
valid because the in terrorem provision issue depended on possible
future facts that did not exist at that time.95
While the court in Maine left the clause open to future litigation
based on ripeness, other states, such as Indiana, bar in terrorem clauses
altogether.96 In addition, particular conditions that contain restraints on
marriage are usually considered in terrorem, forcing courts to determine
the validity of the conditions.97
2.

Marriage and Family Relationships

An individual may also attempt to condition the amount of money
that a beneficiary receives on the beneficiary’s marital and family

93
Id. at 623. Compare Webster v. Morris, 28 N.W. 353, 361 (Wis. 1886) (holding the clause
requiring the beneficiary to reach thirty years of age and be mature was in terrorem and
against public policy), with Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d 619, 624 (Me. 2001) (holding that a
clause requiring the beneficiary to not harass other potential beneficiaries was valid).
94
Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d at 624. The probate court declined to determine that the antiharassment clause in the trust was, as a matter of law, against public policy and thus
unenforceable. Id. at 623. The probate court declined to find any undue influence
regarding the attorney’s duel representation of Ms. Lewis and David because undue
influence requires more proof than what Lawrence provided. Id. at 622. The court stated
its intention to leave open the question as to future enforceability of the anti-harassment
clause and awarded Lawrence attorney fees on the basis of probable cause. Id. at 621. On
appeal, the beneficiary challenged the court’s decision not to strike the anti-harassment
clause. Id. at 624. Lawrence also challenged the probate court’s decision regarding undue
influence, and the Supreme Court of Maine upheld the probate court’s decision, reasoning
that there was no undue influence. Id. The personal representatives filed a cross-appeal,
challenging the court’s statement on an unripe issue of future litigation over the antiharassment clause and the court’s award of attorney fees to Lawrence. Id. at 621, 624.
95
Id. at 624. Further, the Supreme Court of Maine upheld the award of attorney fees to
Lawrence because his claims were made in good faith. Id. at 625.
96
IND. CODE § 29-1-6-2 (2004). Specifically, the statute states:
If, in any will admitted to probate in any of the courts of this state,
there is a provision or provisions providing that if any beneficiary
thereunder shall take any proceeding to contest such will or to prevent
the admission thereof to probate, or provisions to that effect, such
beneficiary shall thereby forfeit any benefit which said will made for
said beneficiary, such provision or provisions shall be void and of no
force or effect.
Id.
97
U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 871 (Or. 1954). According to
the court, it is the absence of a gift that determines whether a condition is a threat under the
in terrorem rule, making the condition invalid. Id.; see also infra Part II.E.2.
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relationships.98 A provision of a will or a trust is usually invalid if it
tends to encourage disruption or formation of a family relationship.99
Some courts have invalidated discriminatory regulations, such as a
condition that an individual must marry someone of a particular racial,
ethnic, or religious background.100
As a general rule, conditions pertaining to family relationships are
invalid.101 In Maddox v. Maddox,102 a provision in a will allowed an
inheritance to go to a woman only if she married one of six men.103 The
Virginia Supreme Court held that the condition was void as an
unreasonable restraint on marriage.104

98
See infra notes 101–14 and accompanying text (describing various court cases
involving restraints on marriage).
99
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003); see also infra notes 101–14 and
accompanying text. Exceptions to the rule exist. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying
text. Regarding what is left of a trust after an individual provision is held invalid, the
Restatement gives both the courts and the trustees the power to eliminate provisions at
their discretion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003). According to the
Restatement:
(1) The court may modify an administrative or distributive provision
of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an
administrative or distributive provision, if because of circumstances
not anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation will further
the purposes of the trust. (2) If a trustee knows or should know of
circumstances that justify judicial action under Subsection (1) with
respect to an administrative provision, and of the potential of those
circumstances to cause substantial harm to the trust or its beneficiaries,
the trustee has a duty to petition the court for appropriate modification
of or deviation from the terms of the trust.
Id.
100
Hickok, supra note 4, at 17; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-6-2 (2004) (stating that a
provision in a will or trust that puts a restraint on marriage is acceptable, but the actual
condition is void). A will in which a husband gave his wife land containing the restriction
that the wife remained a widow was not a restraint on marriage because the condition
contained only words of limitation. Summit v. Yount, 9 N.E. 582, 582–84 (Ind. 1886).
Compare Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 277 (1883) (holding invalid a provision in a
will stating that a girl will not get an annual amount of money set aside for her if she
married a second time), with Summit, 9 N.E. at 582–84 (holding valid a provision in a will
that limited a beneficiary’s inheritance on her not marrying).
101
See infra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
102
52 Va. 804 (1854). In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court found that a provision that
restrained a daughter’s choice of spouses to about six men was unreasonable and void. Id.
at 808–09.
103
Id. at 805. In this case, a father stated in his will that the daughter would get the
remainder of his estate as long as she remained a member of a certain society. Id. Once she
married a man who was not a member of the society, it was the society’s rule to not allow
the daughter to be in the society, and thus the daughter could not meet the condition. Id.
104
Id. at 808–09.
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However, a valid exception to the rule is the termination of a
spouse’s interest in a testator’s trust if the testator’s spouse remarries.105
In Lewis v. Searles,106 a will contained a provision that disallowed giving
property to the testator’s spouse if she remarried.107 The Missouri
Supreme Court held that the provision was not against public policy
because it did not punish the testator’s spouse for marrying; rather, it
was intended to aid the testator’s spouse while single.108 The court
discussed the conflict and confusion surrounding the restraint of
marriage, explaining that the general rule that a restraint on marriage
was void against public policy had been “eaten out with exceptions.”109
Most courts have held that a trust with a condition that the
beneficiary divorce or separate from his or her spouse is against public
policy and therefore invalid, but this principle is subject to certain

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003).
452 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1970). In this case, a plaintiff sought to void a condition in a will
that stated the plaintiff would get property only if she remained unmarried. Id. at 154. The
court ruled that the condition was valid because it was intended not to punish but to aid
the plaintiff while single. Id. at 159.
107
Id. at 154. Specifically, the will stated:
I devise to my niece, Hattie L. Lewis, all of my real and personal
property of which I may die seized and possessed, so long as she
remains single and unmarried. In the event that the said Hattie L.
Lewis shall marry, then and in this event I desire that all of my
property, both real and personal be divided equally between my nieces
and nephews as follows, to the said Hattie L. Lewis, an undivided one
third, to Letitia A. LaForge, wife of A. C. LaForge, an undivided one
third, and to James R. Lewis an undivided one third.
Id.
108
Id. at 159.
109
Id. at 155. The court stated that modern opinion seems to be that the right of the
donor to attach conditions pertaining to marriage will outweigh the maxim that marriage
should be free, except where the conditions have no reasonable purpose. Id. Specifically,
the court stated:
The history of this most ancient rule is discussed in that Annotation. It
is obvious that the cases on the subject are both conflicting and
confusing, but that most, if not all, courts still give lip service to the
doctrine. The tendency, however, is to consider whether, under the
circumstances, the provision serves a legitimate purpose. And one
reason which the author mentions as most commonly applied is the
desire to furnish support to the devisee while single. Much confusion
has developed in attempts to determine whether such a provision, in
any given case, is a limitation or a condition. It has been indicated that
generally a devise which is to be reduced in the event of marriage is
held to be a condition subsequent.
Id.
105
106
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exceptions and qualifications.110 For example, the Alabama Supreme
Court, in Brizendine v. American Trust & Savings Bank,111 held that a
condition precedent regarding the real estate of the testatrix given to her
son was void.112 The condition required that he give up living with, or
having anything to do with, a named woman to whom he legally
married three months before the execution of the will.113 The court
found it evident that the testatrix intended to bring about a separation or
divorce between her son and his wife, concluding that the condition was
void against public policy.114
In contrast, in United States National Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass115
the Oregon Supreme Court held that a condition in a trust providing that
the testator’s daughter was to receive a certain sum if she proved to the
satisfaction of the trustee that she had not embraced the Catholic faith or
married a man of that faith was valid.116 The court reasoned that an
110
J.F. Ghent, Annotation, Wills: Validity of Condition of Gift Depending on Divorce or
Separation, 14 A.L.R.3d 1219, (1967). An example of an exception is support for female
recipients.
111
101 So. 618 (Ala. 1924). The court ruled that a condition requiring a son to not
associate with his wife was void because it was against public policy. Id. at 622.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 619. Specifically, the will stated:
The other half of my real estate I will bequeath to my own son, Frank
L. Brizendine, provided he will reform, and give up living with, or
having anything to do with this Mrs. Moore by name, whom he now
lives with, and who alienated Frank’s affections from his legitimate
wife and son Frank Brizendine, Jr., and he, Frank Brizendine, shall not
have a dollar of my real estate, unless he forsakes her (Mrs. Moore)
and has nothing to do with her for a period of seven years, and proves
that he has given her, Mrs. Moore, up.
Id. at 618.
114
Id. at 622.
115
275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954). In this case, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a condition
in a trust requiring that an individual neither embrace the Catholic faith nor marry
someone who was Catholic was valid. Id. at 872.
116
Id. Specifically, the will provided:
When my said daughter shall have attained the age of thirty-two years
and upon my death, that is to say, when these two events occur, my
trustee is authorized and directed to transfer, assign and/or pay over
to my said daughter Merle the whole of the trust fund of Fifteen
Thousand ($ 15,000.00) Dollars, or the one-half (1/2) of the entire estate
if sum is more than Thirty Thousand ($ 30,000.00) Dollars, provided
she shall have proved conclusively to my trustee and to its entire
satisfaction that she has not embraced, nor become a member of, the
Catholic faith nor ever married to a man of such faith. In the event my
daughter predeceases me, or having survived me dies prior to
attaining the age of thirty-two years or if living becomes ineligible to
receive the trust fund then I direct the principal of such trust fund to be
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individual has great freedom to dispose of his property before and after
his death.117 In addition to analyzing the marriage aspect of the
condition, the court also analyzed and validated the condition pertaining
to religion based on freedom of expression even though the daughter
claimed that the incentive condition restricted her constitutional freedom
of religion.118
3.

Religion

The general rule regarding a testator’s right to devise conditions
relating to religious freedom is that individuals are free, during their
lives, to promote their religious views among others.119 The court in
divided as follows: —In case either my wife or daughter forfeit their
right to the trust fund, by death or otherwise, I want one or both of
said funds divided between the following parties share and share alike
....
Id. at 862. The lower court concluded that the conditions were valid. Id. The daughter
appealed the lower court’s ruling, arguing that the conditions were against public policy
because she was denied property based solely on her marriage, for she did not herself
become Catholic. Id.
117
Id. at 864. Further, the court stated:
Two general and cardinal propositions give direction and limitation to
our consideration. One is the traditionally great freedom that the law
confers on the individual with respect to the disposition of his
property, both before and after death. . . . The right of a testator to
attach to a gift in his will any lawful terms he sees fit, no matter how
whimsical or capricious, is widely, if not universally, recognized.
Conditions which are regarded as contrary to law or public policy,
which are impossible of performance, or which are too vague and
uncertain in their phraseology to disclose the actual intention of the
testator, will not, however, be enforced, although it is established that
in considering any testamentary condition the court must indulge a
presumption in favor of its validity. When questions arise as to
conditions or provisions being void as being against the public good or
against public policy, great caution is necessary in considering them; at
different times very different views have been entertained as to what is
injurious to the public.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Clayton’s Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C. 413 (Pa. D. & C. 1930) (holding
that a similar provision in the will was valid because, operating only on the choice of a
wife, it was too remote to be regarded as coercive of religious faith).
118
Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 860–72; see infra Part II.E.3.
119
Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. k (2003). In Shapira, a will contained a clause
that conditioned a son’s inheritance on his marriage to a Jewish girl whose parents were
both Jewish. 315 N.E.2d at 826. The court ruled that the religious condition was valid
because the testator was not enforcing religion on the son; rather, the will enforced a
restriction upon the son’s inheritance. Id. at 832. The court reasoned that the provision was
not a full restraint on marriage or religion, and thus it was a reasonable restraint. Id. But
see Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. 804 (1854) (voiding a provision in a will that allowed an
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Snodgrass reasoned that an individual has the power to completely
disinherit someone and is not forced to give a reason for the
disinheritance.120 Although the court noted that it seemed harsh and
cruel that a parent would disinherit his child in the manner used in this
case, no court can interfere as long as the motive is not completely
unreasonable.121
Similar to the opinion in Snodgrass, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas
declared that a father may include a provision in his will that required
his son to marry a Jewish woman with Jewish parents in order to receive
his property in Shapira v. Union National Bank.122 Further, the court in
inheritance to go to a woman only if she married one of six named men). The court held
that the condition was an unreasonable restraint on marriage. Id. at 805. Individuals may
also create charitable trusts during their lifetime or at death to support a chosen religion.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) (“Charitable trust purposes include:
(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of knowledge or education; (c) the
advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal
purposes; and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to the community.”).
120
275 P.2d at 865. Further, the court stated that the father could have given his wealth
to an entity that would express adverse views of a particular religion for which he
harbored ill feelings. Id. The court noted that the father has a unique right to freedom of
expression, which has built our country. Id. at 864. Specifically, the court stated:
It is this unique right to freedom of expression, whether manifested in
the political forum, the church chancel or other arenas of thought and
action, that has not only contributed so much to the greatness of our
country and has given it such a distinctive and distinguished place in
the world family of nations but has given additional vitality and
substance to our valued religious freedom. . . . The other [cardinal
proposition] is that greater freedom, the freedom of opinion and right
to expression in political and religious matters, together with the
incidental and corollary right to implement the attainment of the
ultimate and favored objectives of the religious teaching and social or
political philosophy to which an individual subscribes. We do not
intend to imply hereby that the right to devise or bequeath property is
in any way dependent upon or related to the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech.
Id.
121
Id. at 865. The court stated:
[W]hile it seems harsh and cruel that a parent should disinherit one of
his children and devise his property to others, or cut them all off and
devise it to strangers, from some unworthy motive, yet so long as that
motive, whether from pride or aversion or spite or prejudice, is not resolvable
into mental perversion, no court can interfere.
Id. (citations omitted).
122
315 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct App. 1974). The son whose father’s will contained a
provision that he must marry a Jewish woman argued that the provision was unreasonable
and that the court should apply the Maddox court’s reasoning because he claimed that the
number of eligible Jewish females in this country was a small minority of the population.
Id. at 831. The court determined that the Maddox decision and reasoning should not carry
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Shapira examined the apparent intent of the testator and stated that he
unmistakably intended that his wealth be used to encourage the
preservation of the Jewish faith and blood.123 Thus, the court found that
the purpose of the provision was not merely a negative provision aimed
to punish the son for not meeting the condition, but was meant to help
support the testator’s religion.124
Yet, according to the Restatement, a trust provision is usually invalid
if the provision creates financial pressure regarding the future religious
choices of beneficiaries.125 Examining a condition aimed to control an
individual’s religious conduct, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Drace v. Klinedinst126 held that the disputed condition contained in the
testator’s will was against public policy, and thus it was invalid.127 The
court used Section III of the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, which declares
that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of
conscience, to aid in its decision.128 The will provided that the heirs
could keep the estate as long as they “remained faithful” to a particular
religion, but if any of them forsook this religion, then the estate should
pass to the children of the testator’s son who “remain[ed] true” to this
religion.129 The children “remained faithful” for some time before

over because, although the number of eligible Jewish women was a minority, the provision
was not unreasonable to the point of the unreasonable provision in Maddox, where a girl
had only a handful of men to marry. Id.
123
Id. at 832. Further evidence of the father’s goal to preserve the Jewish faith is that if
his son did not meet the condition and the money did not go to his son, then the money
would go to the State of Israel. Id. The court stated that whether the father’s decision was
wise was not for the court to determine, but the court had a duty to honor the testator’s
intention within the limitations of the law and public policy. Id. The court stated that
“[t]he prerogative granted to a testator by the laws of this state to dispose of his estate
according to his conscience is entitled to as much judicial protection and enforcement as the
prerogative of a beneficiary to receive an inheritance.” Id.
124
Id.
125
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. k (2003). A trust condition offering a
financial inducement to accept or reject a particular faith or set of beliefs about religion is
usually invalid. Id.
126
118 A. 907 (Pa. 1922). The court held that a condition that required an individual
“remain[] faithful” to a particular religion was against public policy and invalid. Id. at 908–
09.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 908. The decedent devised three pieces of land to his son for the term of his
natural life. Id. After the son’s death, the land was to go to the children “provided they
remained faithful to a particular religion; and, in case any of them forsook this religion,
‘then and in that case, to the remaining children of my said son who remain true’ to this
religion.” Id. If a child did not remain faithful, the child’s interest would be forfeited and
given to other named relatives. Id.
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leaving that church and joining another.130 The court reasoned that the
enforcement of the forfeiture would be contrary to public policy.131
Fifty years later, the same Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a
condition based on religion in In re Estate of Laning.132 The court held
that the provision requiring the plaintiffs to remain “members in good
standing of the Presbyterian Church” was valid because the condition
was not illegal, immoral, tortious, or productive of any social evil.133 The
court noted that there may have been an impact on freedom of religion,
but the condition did not impose a loss on the heirs because they never
had any claim upon the estate of the testatrix in the first place.134 The
court saw no basis upon which to deny the testatrix the power to
distribute her property by stipulating that the heirs maintain good
standing in the Presbyterian Church.135
The Laning court reconciled the decisions in Laning and Drace by
explaining the difference between interpretations of the language in the
conditions of the wills.136 Enforcing the “remain true” condition in Drace
would require a determination of the doctrines of that religion and an
inquiry as to whether or not the heirs had in fact “remained true” to
those doctrines.137 The court reasoned that such questions are clearly
improper for a civil court to determine.138 Thus, in addition to looking at
the validity of the condition itself, courts look to the language of the

Id. When the children sought to sell the property, the purchaser questioned the
marketability of the title, fearing that a breach of the religious condition might have
divested the children of title. Id.
131
Id. at 909. Primarily, the court held that the language of the will was not sufficient to
render defeasible the estate divested. Id. Even if the language would otherwise create a
defeasible interest, the enforcement of the forfeiture would violate public policy of the
state. Id.
132
339 A.2d 520 (Pa. 1975). In this case, the court ruled that a provision requiring an
individual to be a member in good standing of a particular church was valid. Id. at 521,
524.
133
Id. At 521. The trial court ruled in favor of appellees. Id. at 522. On appeal, the court
reversed the trial court’s decision. Id. at 526.
134
Id. at 526. The court noted that the only way the heirs had any initial interest in the
estate was to successfully satisfy the conditions the testatrix had attached to the will. Id.
135
Id. at 524.
136
Id. at 522.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 523. Not only would the condition in Drace have required improper inquiries
into the content of religious doctrine, but the evaluation would have been magnified by the
need to probe into the beliefs of the heirs. Id.
130
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condition and the standards by which to measure the behavior of an
individual in order to determine the validity of an incentive condition.139
4.

Clear Language and Measurable Conditions

Regarding the language and evaluation of the proposed condition,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Cassem v. Kennedy140 described the need for
easily measurable conditions.141 The will in Cassem provided that
because a son was “wild, unsettled and irregular in his habits,” the son
should not acquire the settlor’s property until the son “settles down in
life and gets married” or reaches the age of forty.142 The court held that
the condition was not void for uncertainty because it was easy to
determine whether he was married or had attained the age of forty.143
When drafting a condition in a will, testators often create their own
dictionaries, requiring “the art” of judicial interpretation.144 In In re
Hogg’s Estate,145 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to set forth a
standard by which to interpret a testator’s language in an incentive
condition.146 According to the court, the testator’s intent is the most
important factor, for the language is simply a means of expression.147
In addition to the mere language of the condition, the issue of
whether the beneficiary has lived up to specified behavior expressed in
the will is subject to individual variations of interpretation.148 Either an
arbiter or a court has the task of determining whether the benefactor has
breached the condition.149 When the personal conduct stipulated is fairly
definite in nature, such as a requirement that an heir abstain from
gambling or using intoxicating liquor, the task of evaluating the heir’s
See infra Part II.E.4.
35 N.E. 738 (Ill. 1893). In this case, a provision requiring that a son mature was held
valid even though it was written in uncertain terms. Id. at 739.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 738. Specifically, the language in the trust read: “As my son, Joseph Downey, is
wild, unsettled and irregular in his habits, it is my will and desire that he shall not enjoy
the benefit of this devise till he settles down in life and gets married, or until he arrives at
the age of forty years . . . .” Id.
143
Id. at 739.
144
In re Funk Estate, 45 A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. 1946).
145
196 A. 503 (Pa. 1938). In this case, the court tried to make a standard involving the
testator’s intent for the language of an incentive condition. Id. at 505.
146
Id. (“[T]he test is what [the testator’s] words meant to him and the thought which he
intended to convey by them; language being but a medium of expression, the object of
interpretation is to ascertain its import as used by the one who employs it.”).
147
Id.
148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 8.2 cmt. b (1983).
149
Id.
139
140
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conduct is usually uncomplicated and therefore feasible.150 Where no
arbiter is designated and the criteria of the personal conduct are vaguely
defined, courts are generally unwilling to accept the task of examining
the condition and evaluating it to the benefactor’s conduct.151 The
unwillingness of the courts to examine vague criteria in a condition
normally results in a finding that the restraint is void for
indefiniteness.152
When the testator does not appoint a specific arbiter and the
conditions are vague, courts have been reluctant to hold the condition
valid.153 In Jones v. Jones,154 the Missouri Supreme Court held that an
Id. When an arbiter is designated by the testatrix to decide whether a restraint has
been violated, the arbiter’s determination is conclusive unless there exists a judicial finding
that the decision was influenced by something other than an honest attempt to evaluate the
heir’s conduct. Id. For example:
O, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, makes an otherwise
effective deed stating, “to my son, S, and his heirs, but if S should ever
enter into evil ways and acquire bad habits, I reserve the right to enter
and terminate his estate.” Several years later, O is offered a large sum
for Blackacre. Without justification, O notifies S that he considers the
condition violated and attempts to enter and terminate S’s estate. His
determination is not binding and an independent finding will be made
by the court.
Id. § 8.2 illus. 3. Where no arbiter is designated and the criteria of the proscribed conduct is
not so vague, the court is willing to accept the task of determining whether there has been a
breach. Id. § 8.2 cmt b.
151
Id.
152
Id. For example:
O, by an otherwise effective will, devises $50,000 “to my son S, on
condition that S abandon his intemperate habits, immoral consortings
and evil associations.” No arbiter is designated. A finding is
reasonable that the condition fails for indefiniteness, given the
difficulty in defining with any certainty the standard of conduct to
which S is to conform. S is entitled to the $50,000 free of any condition.
Id. § 8.2 illus. 4. In order to avoid invalidating a restraint because of its indefiniteness when
the proscribed conduct is a matter of individual opinion, courts often infer that the testatrix
intended to have a trustee act as the arbiter. Id. Often the trustee may be the one who acts
as the arbiter and determines whether a restraint has been violated despite the absence of a
specific endorsement of an arbiter in a will. Id. A finding is often reasonable when the
trustee is to be the intended arbiter because the trustee is usually the surviving spouse,
other relative, or close friend of the testatrix. Id. The law provides an avenue for judicial
review to avoid unreasonable exercises of power. Id.
153
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 8.2 cmt. b (1983). A trustee is usually under a duty
to the beneficiaries not to carry out a trust provision that the trustee knows or has reason to
know is unlawful. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. e (2003). If the trust does not
fail, the trustee has the duty to administer the property in a lawful manner to accomplish
the trust’s valid purposes. Id.
154
123 S.W. 29, 38 (Mo. 1909). In this case, the court held that a condition was void
because of its uncertainty. Id.
150

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/11

Steiner: Incentinve Conditions: The Validity of Innovative Financial Pare

2006]

Validity of Innovative Financial Parenting

925

incentive condition was void because of the condition’s uncertainty.155
The testator did not provide a trustee with discretionary power to decide
whether the conditions had been met.156 In addition, no rule or test
existed to evaluate the beneficiary’s conduct as it related to the
condition.157
Further, in Farmer’s State Bank & Trust v. Mangold,158 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a condition that required heirs to “do that
which is right” to receive a remainder was invalid for uncertainty.159 The
court stated that because the purpose of the condition was to influence
conduct, the use of “an unexpressed personal and subjective yardstick
for an expressed objective one would distort the testator’s intent and
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the donee to know the standard of
conduct to which he is to conform.”160
According to the Restatement, if a trust provision is not upheld as it
is written and it is susceptible to adaptation to accommodate both public
policy concerns and legitimate settlor objectives, the court may adapt the
provision.161 Thus, a provision may fail as it was originally designed, but
the provision may, nevertheless, be judicially reformed to accomplish the
allowable objectives while removing or minimizing socially undesirable
effects.162

Id. The testator left property to his sons for twenty years. Id. at 30. At the expiration
of the twenty years, if the sons could show themselves to be competent to manage the
estate and to be “sober, industrious and not to be spendthrifts,” then the estate would be
expanded to a fee simple. Id. at 32. If the sons were not reformed, they would have only a
life estate. Id. Consequently, the court held that the sons received the property in fee
simple at the death of their father. Id. at 38.
156
Id.
157
Id. (quoting Schumacker’s Estate v. Reel, 61 Mo. 592, 600 (Mo. 1876)). Further, the
court provided:
In every will creating legacies or trusts, there should be such certainty
as will enable the court to carry them out. Where such uncertainty
exists that the court cannot see what object the testator had in view, or
for what he intended to provide, then the legacy or trust must fail.
Id. at 41.
158
114 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 1953). In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a condition
requiring an individual to “do that which is right” was invalid because it was uncertain.
Id. at 798, 801.
159
Id. at 801. The heirs were two foster children, and the trustee was the foster mother
and wife of the testator. Id. at 798.
160
Id. at 799.
161
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(1) (2003).
162
Id. § 29 cmt. j. The judicial flexibility of altering the condition eliminates an all or
nothing decision and eases speculation and other difficulties inherent in cases related to the
validity of incentive conditions. Id.
155
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Because people are increasingly passing down greater amounts of
wealth, more people want to attach conditions on transfers of wealth in
order to avoid the seemingly negative consequences of inherited
wealth.163 Individuals must consider the validity of their conditions
when composing them. The Restatement sets forth some guidelines, but
it leaves what actually violates public policy open to interpretation.164
Further, states do not always have clear rules to determine the validity of
the conditions.165 The next Part of this Note addresses the need for states
to adopt statutes regarding the validity of incentive conditions in order
to promote a testator’s freedom to distribute wealth as desired and avoid
a mass of litigation resulting from the freedom some testators have taken
in drafting incentive conditions.166
III. ANALYSIS
In order to avoid conflict and excessive litigation, states must
legislatively allow incentive conditions within certain limitations.167
States should explicitly describe and codify statutory limitations to
incentive conditions to avoid uncertainty and promote a testator’s
freedom to distribute his wealth as he desires.168 Codifying the
limitations on incentive conditions, while allowing all others, will also
give beneficiaries the freedom of choice, minimize dead-hand control,
and reduce inefficient litigation.169 Part III.A analyzes the reasons that
states should allow incentive conditions within certain limitations.170
Part III.B examines current case law, statutes, and the Restatements,
finding that they do not sufficiently address incentive conditions and
provides methods so that states can successfully devise a statute that
adequately covers incentive conditions.171

See supra notes 5, 17 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D.
165
See supra Part II.B.
166
See infra Part III.
167
See infra Part III.A.
168
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, at § 1.
169
See infra Part III.B.
170
See infra Part III.A.
171
See infra Part III.B. The lack of state provisions may lead to greater court supervision
with respect to incentive conditions than is presently the case. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 34, § 1.
163
164
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A. Rationale Supporting Incentive Conditions
In order to give testators the power and discretion to distribute their
wealth in a desired manner, states should allow incentive conditions.172
Because incentive conditions permit individuals to control their
beneficiaries’ actions and beliefs in positive ways even after they have
passed, individuals who perceive themselves to be possible beneficiaries
of a substantial inheritance will often feel bound to positively alter their
lives.173 For instance, incentive conditions prohibiting the use of illegal
drugs may result in beneficiaries choosing to abstain from the use of
illegal drugs in order to receive a large sum of money.174 Decisions that
positively alter a beneficiary’s behavior are desirable to the testator, the
beneficiary, and society in general.175 The testator benefits because the
beneficiary behaves in a way that the testator wanted him to behave; the
beneficiary benefits because he is not using drugs and has more money;
and society benefits because there is one less drug user in the
community.176
For many beneficiaries, the extra incentive of a
substantial amount of money will motivate the beneficiary to make
healthier or more productive life choices.177
Conditioning inherited wealth on a particular behavior also reduces
the negative bias that may exist against inherited wealth.178 Incentive
conditions motivate beneficiaries to display good behavior, which will
result in a more productive community as a whole.179 Societal concerns
regarding beneficiaries who squander their inherited dynasty decrease
when society sees that the beneficiaries behave positively.180 If the
community knows that a beneficiary had to actually work productively
to receive a large amount of money through a trust, the community will
appreciate that the money was not simply handed to the beneficiary on a
“silver platter.”181

See infra Part III.A.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. “Positive ways” of altering a beneficiary’s
life is determined by the testator when the testator drafts the conditions.
174
See supra notes 56, 59–60.
175
See supra notes 56, 59–60.
176
See supra notes 56, 59–60.
177
See supra notes 56, 59–60.
178
Langley & Gandara, supra note 51, at D1. “Financial parenting” by means of incentive
conditions is also a sound way to avoid having to pay estate taxes. Id.
179
See supra note 59.
180
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
181
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
172
173
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Incentive conditions also provide testators the freedom to draft
wide-ranging, highly specific provisions for their children’s welfare and
to support the beliefs of the testators.182 For example, in Shapira, the
testator’s goal of providing for the advancement of the Jewish faith
allowed the beneficiary to decide whether he would marry a Jewish
woman, which would cause him to receive his father’s wealth, or not
marry a Jewish woman, which would cause the State of Israel to receive
the inheritance.183 The court in Shapira correctly recognized the
importance of the testator’s wish to motivate the advancement of his
religion.184 This freedom to permit a testator to describe how he wishes
to distribute his wealth is essential because it allows the testator to direct
his wealth as he would if he were alive.185 The freedom to create
incentive conditions still allows the beneficiary to control his own life as
long as state statutes impose certain limitations on incentive
conditions.186
Just as an individual can disinherit someone from his will without
providing a reason, the same individual should be allowed to articulate
incentive conditions in trusts that limit another from receiving his
wealth.187 Because states do not question the reasoning behind an
individual’s decision to disinherit another, states should not scrutinize
an incentive condition in a trust unless a major public policy flaw exists
in the testator’s condition.188 Incentive conditions, when used correctly,
are beneficial to reinforce the values that have already been instilled in
the beneficiaries.189 However, incentive conditions should not punish
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
184
See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
185
See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. However, no court will tolerate the
condition if the action required is illegal. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
186
See infra Part IV for a sample statute describing the limitations.
187
See supra note 120 and accompanying text. If a person with a will can include or
exclude another from his will for any reason he wants, he should be able to include or
exclude another from his trust for any reason he wants. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v.
Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 872 (Or. 1954). Because an individual earned his money, he
should be able to transfer the money using any incentive condition he wishes to describe.
Id.
188
Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 872. However, a court may invalidate a will when an individual
contests the will where the testator has disinherited the individual based on theories of a
lack of mental capacity or undue influence. Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d 619, 621 (Me. 2001).
For an explanation of the types of public policy flaws, see infra Parts III.B.3, IV (discussing
the limitations that should be contained in a statute).
189
Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58. Lansky stated that reaction to trust restrictions can be
strong resentment, or even hatred, when a beneficiary feels that the trust’s restrictions are
unfair. Id. In addition, in some situations, the beneficiary may even “overvalue the action
that was unfairly restricted.” Id.
182
183
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behavior the settlor considers wrong.190 For instance, when the condition
in Brizendine only awarded the beneficiary if he had nothing to do with
his wife, the purpose of the condition was to punish the beneficiary for
staying married to a woman that the testatrix did not favor.191
Although incentive conditions should be allowed because of the
testator’s right to control his wealth, counterarguments do exist.192 The
first concern is that incentive conditions may unreasonably hinder a
beneficiary’s freedom of choice, as illustrated in Maddox, where the court
failed to honor a provision that intruded on a beneficiary’s freedom to
marry.193 A second counterargument is that incentive conditions that
require a reasonableness interpretation inevitably vary, inviting conflict
and litigation.194 A third criticism of incentive conditions is that they can
lead to a “carrot and stick” approach to transferring wealth, which can
cause tension within families because the whole notion of incentive
conditions implies distrust.195 The carrot and stick approach implies
distrust because a beneficiary is portrayed as doing anything the testator
conditioned in order to obtain the testator’s wealth, eliminating the
beneficiary’s free choice.196 A fourth counterargument is that incentive
conditions perpetuate dead-hand control, the ability to control others
from the grave.197 Finally, the fifth concern is that testators will
Id.
See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
192
See infra notes 193–98 and accompanying text.
193
See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Further, an individual’s intentions will not
be fulfilled when a court invalidates a condition that the individual has prescribed.
Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. 804, 808 (1854).
194
See supra text accompanying notes 80, 103.
195
Langley & Gandara, supra note 51, at D1. The carrot and stick approach compares
incentive conditions to dangling a carrot in front of an animal to get the animal to do
something. Id. Further, Hoge states that “[e]ven after the parents are dead, the child will
feel like, ‘I’m still being put to the test.’” Id. Critics charge that such trusts bring a
“carnival-like atmosphere to trust administration—hit the target, get a prize.” Wells,
Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58. Critics of family incentive trusts also claim that the
increasing popularity of incentive conditions make it clear that knowing how to make
millions implies nothing about knowing how to raise a family. Katherine Hennessey
Wikoff & Rachel Eisenman, The Trust-Fund Dole: King Lear Syndrome?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
1999, at A15. The critics point out that controlling purse strings are demonstrated in
Shakespeare’s play, King Lear, where the strings attached to the inheritance strangles the
giver and recipient. Id. In addition, in the play, the only daughter to love her father in the
end is the one who refuses to let the conditions run her life. Id. The concept of family
incentive conditions has the potential to become an obscene form of bribery that has
significant flaws unless states codify some guidelines and restrictions on the ability to
control from the grave through incentive conditions. Id.
196
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
197
Whiting, supra note 4, at 8. Hobhouse wrote 125 years ago about the “cold and
numbing influence of the Dead Hand”:
190
191
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ambiguously describe the standards necessary to measure a condition or
fail to adequately name an individual who is to evaluate the beneficiary’s
conduct.198 Although these are legitimate concerns, they are not
persuasive reasons to entirely invalidate incentive conditions because
states can adopt statutes to address the criticisms, as discussed in the
next Part.199
B. Inadequacies of Current Case Law, Statutes, and Restatements
Instead of allowing every incentive condition, states should
legislatively permit incentive conditions but codify specific limitations to
guard against abuse.200 By placing limits on the use of incentive
conditions, states can allow a testator to distribute his wealth as desired
but simultaneously prevent excessive limits on beneficiaries’ rights
through dead-hand control.201 By creating a uniform statutory provision
regarding incentive conditions, the fear of varying decisions by courts
may also be addressed and resolved.202
States have at least three general options available regarding how to
handle incentive conditions in order to avoid tying up the courts with

A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons
and events which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he
cannot know and see. Within the former province we may push his
natural affections and his capacity of judgment to made better
dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for him. Within
the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment is
constantly baffled by the course of events . . . people are the best judges
of their own concerns; or if they are not, that it is better for them, on
moral grounds, that they should manage their own concerns
themselves, and that it cannot be wrong continually to claim this
liberty for every Generation of mortal men.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 183–85 (1880). The general, time-honored rule, as
illustrated in Snodgrass, that an individual is free to dispose of his property as he sees fit,
with or without restrictions or conditions, also has flaws because of the testators’ ability to
control others from the grave. Whiting, supra note 4, at 11. The law is less tolerant of deadhand control. Id. When an individual’s trust attempts to control another from the grave,
even with the best of intentions, the beneficiary may retaliate against the strings that are
attached to the wealth because of the beneficiary’s hatred and resentment. Clark Hill PLC,
supra note 58. One of the objectives of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to put a finite limit
on dead-hand control by limiting the number of years that a trust can control the choices
and behaviors of other individuals. See supra note 78.
198
See infra notes 236–47.
199
See supra Part III.B.
200
See infra Part IV for a sample statute with specific limitations.
201
See supra notes 78, 97; see also infra notes 226–35 and accompanying text.
202
See infra text accompanying notes 228–30.
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future litigation.203 This Part analyzes the three possible options for
states.204 The first option is to adopt and codify the Restatement’s policy
as set forth in section 29.205 The second option is to adopt only the first
two requirements of the Restatement: the requirement concerning the
Rule Against Perpetuities and the requirement that an incentive
condition not reward illegal activities.206 Finally, the third option is to
develop codified restrictions relating to specific instances that invalidate
an incentive condition, allowing conditions that do not fit any named
restriction.207
1.

Codifying the Restatement

The first option, adopting and codifying the Restatement, does not
sufficiently address the problems related to incentive conditions because
the courts would be left to determine which particular conditions satisfy
the ambiguous statute.208 A state that adopts this option will encourage
individuals to utilize incentive conditions and allow the state courts to
determine which particular conditions satisfy the ambiguous statute.209
The Restatement merely provides that particular incentive conditions
may fail if the provision is against public policy, leaving the courts to
determine exactly which provisions fail because of public policy.210
Forcing the courts to determine the validity of specific conditions invites
confusion and litigation, while, at the same time, families involved in
condition disputes are divided over the distribution described in a
condition.211 As illustrated in Lewis, a potential beneficiary may never
know definitively whether he has satisfied the condition and may have
to bring multiple lawsuits to determine the condition’s validity.212

See infra text accompanying notes 204–07.
See infra notes 208–47 and accompanying text.
205
See infra notes 208–16 and accompanying text.
206
See infra notes 217–23 and accompanying text.
207
See infra notes 224–48 and accompanying text. The Restatement provides that an
incentive condition is invalid if it calls for the beneficiary to commit a criminal or tortious
act, if it violates the applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, or if it is against public policy.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
208
See supra Part II.D.
209
See supra Part II.D.
210
See supra Part II.D.
211
See supra Part II.D.
212
See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. In Estate of Lewis, the court determined
that a beneficiary’s challenge of an anti-harassment clause was void at that time because
the issue was not ripe at the time of the decision. 770 A.2d 619, 624 (Me. 2001).
203
204
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Therefore, the current form of the Restatement has unfortunate
consequences.213 Fearing that a court may invalidate a certain condition,
the individual may feel compelled to conservatively alter a desired
condition or choose to not include the condition at all, which will
prevent him from distributing his wealth as he desires.214 However,
individuals should have the right to decide how to distribute their
wealth by using incentive conditions, just as individuals have the right to
distribute their wealth by disinheriting others during their lifetime.215
Thus, adopting and codifying the Restatement may hurt a testator more
than it helps him.216
2.

Codifying the First Two Restatement Clauses

Because the Restatement’s current form regarding public policy
creates ambiguity, a second option for states is to adopt a statute that
only requires an incentive condition to comply with the Rule Against
Perpetuities or not require illegal activity.217 However, this option also
does not sufficiently address the full issues of incentive conditions.218 By
adopting this option, a state’s legislation conveys that it values an
individual’s freedom to make conditions and encourages an individual
to include incentive conditions in his will or trust.219 A state may choose
this option because an individual’s wealth is his own, and he should
have the freedom to transfer his wealth in the way that he sees fit.220 In
addition, conditions do not impose a loss on an heir because the money
never belonged to the heir in the first place.221
While allowing virtually any incentive condition gives individuals
freedom to transfer their wealth in any manner they choose, regardless
of public policy, the financial incentives for potential beneficiaries may

See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text for an illustration of a condition that a
court voided.
214
See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
215
See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 208–15 and accompanying text.
217
See supra note 73 and accompanying text. For example, this statute will read:
Section 2: Validity of Incentive Conditions
An incentive condition contained in a trust or will is invalid if it (a)
violates rules relating to perpetuities or (b) contains a purpose that is
unlawful or its performance calls for the commission of a criminal or
tortious act.
218
See infra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
219
See infra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
220
See supra notes 115–18, 187 and accompanying text.
221
See supra text accompanying note 134; supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
213
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unreasonably control the beneficiary’s life.222 Although the Rule Against
Perpetuities addresses the issue of dead-hand control by limiting the
period of time in which a testator can control another to twenty-one
years, the restriction alone is inadequate because the Rule Against
Perpetuities does not reach the control a testator can have over a
beneficiary when the period is less than the twenty-one years.223
3.

Codifying Certain Limitations Involving Public Policy

In contrast to the first two options, the third option, allowing
incentive conditions but codifying limitations to the allowance of such
conditions, does sufficiently address incentive condition issues because it
permits the conditions but provides boundaries for testators to work
within.224 In order to effectively describe requirements concerning
incentive conditions, a state must address a wide range of public policy
issues that may lead to confusion and conflict, such as the freedoms to
associate, marry, and practice a religion.225
The counterarguments of incentive conditions as applied to this
third option should be addressed. The argument that an incentive
condition hinders a beneficiary’s freedom of choice fails because
beneficiaries do not have rights to the money.226 Further, the law
demonstrates that if the testators have some public policy limits placed
upon them, then the issue of beneficiary’s rights will be non-existent.227
Addressing the second concern, a purpose of the uniform state
statute is to remedy varying decisions by the courts.228 Delineating
which incentive conditions are invalid will provide more detailed
guidelines for determining public policy violations in order to avoid
future litigation.229 With a clear and exclusive list of invalidating
conditions, individuals who desire to transfer their wealth may create
incentive conditions and know that the conditions will be valid by
running the conditions through the guidelines of the statute.230

222
See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (describing a case where one woman’s
inheritance was conditioned on her marrying one of six men).
223
See supra note 51.
224
See infra text accompanying notes 225–48.
225
See supra note 187.
226
See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
227
See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
228
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
229
See supra Part II.E.4.
230
See supra Part II.E.4.
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With respect to the carrot and stick concern, potential beneficiaries
will profit because the statute will ensure that the beneficiaries’ free will
is not stripped from them and the conditions will be more reasonable.231
By setting out the invalid incentive conditions, beneficiaries and testators
will know ahead of time what is and is not appropriate.232
The fourth counterargument, dead-hand control, while not
necessarily always advantageous, can be beneficial in promoting
productivity or values, and thus limitations will keep the condition from
violating any public criticism of dead-hand control.233 Further, as
circumstances and social policy changes, legislation can alter the list of
limitations to ensure reasonableness through ratifications and
amendments.234 Having the ability to amend the statute, a state’s
legislation will provide families definite rules regarding the validity of a
condition, which will in turn minimize conflicts within families and
reduce litigation in the courts.235
Finally, addressing the fifth concern regarding ambiguity within the
condition, a state’s statute should describe the necessary language the
condition must contain as well as the standards by which to measure the
beneficiary’s behavior.236 Not only must the settlor possess the intent to
have a trust, but the settlor must also express his intent effectively in
writing or by communicating it to another.237 Although using formal or
See supra text accompanying notes 195–96.
See supra text accompanying notes 195–96.
233
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
234
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
235
See supra Part II.E.4.
236
See supra text accompanying note 198.
237
GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 11 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 2004). Bogert refers to language
in Semple v. Semple, 105 So. 134, 136 (Fla. 1925), which states:
The grantor’s intention, with which he executes a deed of conveyance
to another, which intention he does not reveal at the time of the
conveyance and of which the grantee knows nothing, and the
circumstances of the transaction are not of such character that an
intention of the parties to create a trust may be presumed, does not
create a trust upon the land conveyed. In both an express and
resulting trust the element of intention to create a trust must exist
between the parties. In one case the intention is expressed, in the other
it is implied. A constructive trust arises entirely by the operation of
law without reference to any actual or supposed intention of creating a
trust and often directly contrary to such intention. They are entirely in
invitum and are forced upon the conscience of the trustee for the
purpose of working out right and justice or frustrating fraud.
Id. “A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust
relationship.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13, Intention to Create Trust (2003).
231
232
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technical language is not a prerequisite to determine the validity of a
trust, the settlor must clearly describe his desired provisions and
standards.238 In his will, a testator must also name the person who shall
determine whether the beneficiary has met the behavior set forth in the
provisions.239 The only public policy requirement is that the trustee is to
have the functions and duties that are incidental to trusteeship.240 For
instance, the Laning court reconciled its decision with the Drace court’s
decision by explaining the difference between the language and
standards of the provisions, where a “remain[] faithful” condition was
invalid because of vagueness, while a condition requiring beneficiaries to
remain “members in good standing of the Presbyterian Church” was
valid.241
Furthermore, to create a trust, a settlor must show his intent with
certainty and provide the terms of the trust.242 For example, the Jones
court found that the testator did not provide for a trustee with
discretionary power to decide whether the conditions had been met.243
In addition, the trust in Jones provided no rule or test to evaluate the

238
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1 (referring to Teal v. Pleasant Grove Local Union
No. 204, 75 So. 335 (Ala. 1917)). Specifically, George G. Bogert and George T. Bogert’s
hornbook on trusts states:
In order to create an express trust the settlor’s intent must be expressed
and not merely formed in his own mind. Although it may be
expressed (subject to formality requirements later stated) by conduct of
the settlor, the use of written or spoken words is the method almost
universally employed. The trust property and the beneficiaries must
be described with certainty. No particular words or phrases need be
used, and words of trusteeship are not necessarily conclusive.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 11.
239
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 11.
240
Id. § 1, at 466. In some cases, the courts have found that an expression made by the
settlor contained the intent to create a trust even though the settlor did not set up a trust
himself. Id. Also, consider In re Butler’s Will, where an intent to have a trust was shown
when the settlor expressed his intent that the gift for the beneficiary should be managed by
another person because of the beneficiary’s inability to manage the gift herself. 151
N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
241
See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 117, 150 (discussing
the effects of a vague condition). Further, the Cassem v. Kennedy court stated: “Had the
conditions stopped with the words ‘till he settles down in life,’ it might have been said the
event was not capable of definite ascertainment,—that is to say, there might be a difference
of opinion as to whether a man had ‘settled down in life.’” 35 N.E. 738, 739 (Ill. 1893); see
supra notes 140–43.
242
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1.
243
Jones v. Jones, 123 S.W. 29, 38 (Mo. 1909); see supra notes 153–57 and accompanying
text.
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heir’s conduct as it related to the condition.244 Courts that invalidate a
condition because the testator failed to describe a specific standard of
conduct have ruled correctly because if a beneficiary is to meet a certain
condition, a testator must specifically describe the standard that
measures the beneficiary’s conduct.245
Standards for meeting an
incentive condition are essential because a beneficiary will know exactly
what he has to do to receive the wealth that the testator is willing to
transfer to him.246 Furthermore, when a testator clearly knows the state’s
standards by which the state evaluates the testator’s conditions, the
testator will be certain that the condition he drafted will be valid.247
Thus, in order to allow an individual freedom to transfer his wealth
as he sees fit, while ensuring potential beneficiaries reasonable
conditions, a state should adopt a statute that provides a list involving
specific instances that will invalidate an incentive condition.248 Part IV
provides an example of a state statute that addresses specific incentive
conditions with codified limitations.249
IV. CONTRIBUTION
States may face increased litigation if they fail to adopt a statute that
sufficiently addresses incentive conditions.250 States have several options
in adopting a statute to deal with the validity of incentive conditions.251
Some of the options for a statute regulating incentive conditions include:
(1) a statute that is similar to the Restatement, which allows an incentive
condition that does not require illegal activity, does not violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities, and does not violate public policy; (2) a statute,
where the only restrictions are the Rule Against Perpetuities and a
condition that calls for an unlawful, criminal, or tortious act; or (3) a
statute that contains specific incentive conditions that are invalid,

Jones, 123 S.W. at 38. Further, some courts have found that the conditions were
sufficiently certain while others have found enough vagueness and indefiniteness in
similar conditions to render the trusts void. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1.
245
See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
246
See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
247
See supra text accompanying note 168.
248
See infra Part IV for a statute and the description of the statute that provides specific
limitations regarding incentive conditions.
249
See infra Part IV.
250
See supra Part III.
251
See supra Part III.
244
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including the particular topics that violate public policy and lack the
requisite descriptive language of the condition.252
First, this Note proposes that states should allow incentive
conditions.253 Further, states should adopt statutes that take the
uncertainty out of public policy. Finally, this Note proposes that states
not only address incentive conditions by statute, but that states adopt
statutes that contain specific incentive conditions that are invalid in
addition to ones that simply violate public policy. Thus, this Part
provides a sample statute with corresponding commentary that allows
incentive conditions while codifying specific limitations.
A Proposed Statute Involving Incentive Conditions
Section 1: Incentive Conditions Presumed Valid
An incentive condition in a will or trust is presumed valid
and is invalid only if described in Section 2 or Section 3.
Section 2: Validity of Incentive Conditions
An incentive condition contained in a trust or will is invalid if
it: (a) violates rules relating to perpetuities; (b) contains a
purpose that is unlawful or its performance calls for the
commission of a criminal or tortious act; (c) is intended only
to threaten a beneficiary with no intention of legally enforcing
the condition; (d) restricts a beneficiary’s right to marry any
individual unless the money is clearly for support until a
beneficiary marries; (e) restricts a beneficiary’s right to
associate with particular individuals; or (f) restricts the right
of an individual to practice a particular religion.
Section 3: Language and Standards of an Incentive Condition
An incentive condition is invalid when: (a) the terms of the
condition are ambiguous or unclear; (b) the condition cannot
be reasonably measured; or (c) the individual determining
whether a condition is met has a personal interest in the
evaluation.254

252
253
254

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
The proposed statute is italicized and is the contribution of the author.
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Commentary
A statute that clearly states limitations to incentive conditions will
provide guidelines for conditions that violate public policy, which will
avoid future litigation.255 States that choose to adopt an expansion of the
Restatement should provide further guidelines as to the validity of an
incentive condition in order to avoid future litigation.256 With more
guidelines, individuals who desire to transfer their wealth may create
incentive conditions and know the conditions will be valid by running
the conditions through the guidelines of the statute.257 Potential
beneficiaries will appreciate such a statute because it will ensure that the
beneficiaries’ free will is not stripped from them and the conditions will
be more reasonable.258
The first section of the statute simply states the presumption that any
incentive condition is valid if it does not fall into any of the following
sections of the statute. Thus, to easily determine if a given condition is
valid, an individual must ensure that the condition does not have traits
described in the next two sections.
The second section lists specific ways that an incentive condition
could fail. As mentioned in the Restatement, the first two subsections
address the Rule Against Perpetuities and any condition that calls for a
criminal or tortiuous act.259 Subsection (c) concerns in terrorem
provisions. In terrorem provisions are merely empty threats, as
discussed earlier, and it is beneficial to prohibit such conditions to
promote efficiency in the courts and tranquility among families.260
Subsections (d) and (e) address the general right for a beneficiary to
marry and associate. However, within the subsection, one exception
exists for conditions that put a restraint on marriage when its purpose is
clearly for support of the beneficiary. Finally, subsection (f) states that
no individual can restrain another’s religious choice. An individual can
encourage a particular religion but cannot condition a transfer upon
another not choosing a particular religion.261

See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
257
See supra Part III.C.
258
See supra Part III.C.
259
See supra note 73 for the specific language of the Restatement.
260
See supra Part II.E.1.
261
For example, a condition is valid when it reads: “To A if A is a member of the
Catholic church,” because the condition merely encourages a religion. However, a
255
256
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Section three of the proposed statute describes the language required
to render an incentive condition valid. Each subsection is present in
order to promote efficiency. Subsection (a) requires clear terms, forcing
drafters to consider potential ramifications of various interpretations of a
condition in order to ensure the validity of the condition. Further, unless
the terms are reasonably measurable, no reason exists to contain the
condition because immeasurable conditions invite conflicts and
confusion. Finally, to avoid the problem of having trustees with
conflicting interests regarding the evaluation of the condition, subsection
(c) states that a trustee must not have the potential to gain financially
depending on his evaluation of the condition. Thus, the proposed
statute adequately incorporates the freedom to include incentive
conditions in a will or trust while providing specific public policy
guidelines that allow beneficiaries the freedom to make life choices as
well.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, individuals will transfer a magnitude of wealth in the
upcoming years. Individuals are increasingly attaching conditions in
their wills and trusts that a beneficiary must meet in order to receive any
or all of the assets. The conditions reflect the desires of the testator,
including family and religious desires as well as work productivity
standards. The number of individuals attaching conditions that depend
on behavior is growing, just as the creativity of the conditions is
expanding. The conditions may encourage or completely control the
actions of the beneficiary, and receiving money may depend on the
behavior or beliefs of the beneficiaries.
While individuals are relying on incentive conditions, many states
do not address the validity of incentive conditions in their statutes.
Further, case treatment of incentive conditions is limited while the
amount of creativity used in making the conditions is growing. The
validity of an incentive condition is often subject to interpretation, which
leads to litigation. Individuals wishing to attach incentive conditions to
their wealth deserve to know their state’s guidelines and limits
regarding the validity of an incentive condition so that their wishes for
their wealth distributions are met.

condition is invalid when it reads, “To A, but not if A is a member of the Catholic church,”
because the condition restricts A’s right to practice a particular religion.
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States should provide its citizens with an exclusive list of the types of
conditions that invalidate an incentive condition. Such a statute will
provide the assurance that a condition is valid, grant potential
beneficiaries freedom to prohibit anyone from controlling them for
reasons that are destructive, and decrease unnecessary and inefficient
litigation.
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